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Hell. . . with the game we've got, my grandmother could have
negotiated those TV contracts.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Football League (NFL)' has been attacked for
possible antitrust violations on many occasions. Player drafts,' the
reserve clause,4 and arbitration agreements 5 have all been subject
to antitrust challenges. 6 Many other cases have addressed antitrust
violations concerning all professional sports.7 The area of profes-
sional sports that has come under recent scrutiny is the relation-
1. Carroll Rosenbloom, quoted in D. HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
THE NFL 47 (1986). Carroll Rosenbloom was the owner of the Los Angeles Rams.
2. The National Football League is an unincorporated, non-profit association. NFL
CONST. art. 11, § 2.2.
3. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
4. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977).
5. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
6. Other examples have also appeared concerning specific alleged violations. See
United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 n.2 (most suitable
playing facilities); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1971) (doctrine of essential facilities); and International Boxing Club of New
York, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959) (mergers of competitors).
7. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (baseball exempt from antitrust law);
United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); and Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n,
358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
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ship between professional sports and television.
The revenues yielded from television broadcasts have had a
major impact on professional sports.' No other single factor has
had more impact in the profitability and marketability of profes-
sional sports. Football has developed a significant relationship with
the major television networks and therefore has had the biggest
impact on the attractiveness and earnings derived from broadcast
of professional sports events.9
The NFL established extensive television coverage through lu-
crative contracts with the networks over the years. Their right to
do so was questioned in several suits.10 In response, the NFL suc-
cessfully lobbied Congress for the Sports Broadcasting Act.1" This
gave the NFL a limited exemption from antitrust law."5 The NFL
has relied on this exemption to establish its present level of televi-
sion coverage.
The limited exemption created by the Sports Broadcasting
Act has evolved to become the NFL's ultimate shield from compe-
tition."3 Because the NFL is one association comprised of twenty-
eight member teams, 4 application of the Sherman Act1" to the
8. Together, ABC, CBS, and NBC contributed more than $700 million to the profes-
sional leagues of football, baseball, and basketball in 1986. This was roughly ten times the
amount they paid for rights a decade earlier. See Brown, New TV Deals Might Alter Out-
look, USA Today, Dec. 31, 1986, at Cl, col. 3. During Super Bowl XX, January 1986, thirty
seconds of advertising time sold for $550,000. By way of comparison, thirty seconds of ad-
vertising time during "prime time" averages approximately $118,000. Super Bowl XXI, Jan-
uary 1987, established a record $600,000 for thirty seconds. See Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1985,
at D2, col. 1. See also Advertising Age, Sept. 29, 1986, at 70. Randy Vataha, a former NFL
player and a USFL owner, asked "Where is the NFL going in the near future? TV is liter-
ally the heart of the NFL-much more so than any other sport. And there are a lot of ways
to add up the value of the NFL to TV." Brown, supra.
9. For example, in 1978, total payments to the NFL from television broadcasts were
$152.5 million. In 1979, they were $160.5 million, and in 1980, the total amount was $166.5
million. All of these revenues were shared equally among the member teams in the league.
From 1966 to 1980 the percentage of total annual revenue per team for the NFL, derived
through radio and television, rose from 34.4% to 45.1%. See Quinn & Warren, Professional
Team Sports' New Legal Arena: Television and the Player's Right of Publicity, 16 IND. L.
REV. 487 (Spring 1983).
10. See, e.g., United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953), petition for
construction of final judgment, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
11. Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1976)). See also infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
12. Id. Other professional sports, such as hockey, baseball, and basketball, have also
been granted this limited exemption.
13. The contracts act as a "shield" because network coverage of a professional football
league is necessary for its survival. The NFL has contracted with all three networks. This
author suggests that, despite the recent decisions, the NFL's use of the three networks is an
unreasonable restraint of trade in today's economic market.
14. The twenty-eight member teams are: Atlanta Falcons, Chicago Bears, Dallas Cow-
[Vol. 4:357
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league has brought about mixed reviews from scholars and
practitioners.
The NFL's television contracts provide a large share of each
individual team's revenue which enables them to be profitable. For
example, the NFL's 1977 television contracts were worth more
than $650 million. 6 By contrast, in 1981 the National Basketball
Association entered into a reported $88 million television con-
tract. 7 The NFL's current billion dollar contracts with the major
television networks provide huge subsidies to each team. These
revenues cannot be obtained elsewhere."8
In 1986, the United States Football League (USFL)'9 brought
suit against the NFL. 20 The USFL asked for $1.69 billion in dam-
ages and an injunction prohibiting the NFL from dealing with all
three major networks.21 The USFL alleged, in part, that the NFL
inhibited and effectively eliminated the USFL's ability to obtain
national network television exposure and revenue.2
After the trial, the jury concluded that the NFL was in fact a
boys, Detroit Lions, Green Bay Packers, Los Angeles Rams, Minnesota Vikings, New Orle-
ans Saints, New York Giants, Philadelphia Eagles, St. Louis Cardinals, San Francisco 49ers,
Seattle Seahawks, Washington Redskins, Buffalo Bills, Cincinnati Bengals, Cleveland
Browns, Denver Broncos, Houston Oilers, Indianapolis Colts, Kansas City Chiefs, Los Ange-
les Raiders, Miami Dolphins, New England Patriots, New York Jets, Pittsburgh Steelers,
San Diego Chargers, and Tampa Bay Buccaneers. See generally NFL CONST. art. IV, § 4.4.
15. The Sherman Act §1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), provides in pertinent part: "Every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. "
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), provides in pertinent part: "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ... "
16. See Quinn & Warren, supra note 9, at 487 n.2.
17. Id. This shows the NFL can command higher prices for its product.
18. The NFL is currently in its last year of a five year, $2.1 billion contract. Television
commercial sponsors pay the networks, the networks pay the sponsors, and the teams pay
the players. See First Amended Complaint, at 25, United States Football League v. National
Football League, No. 84 Civ. 7484 (S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter USFL v. NFL].
19. The United States Football League (USFL) is a non-profit unincorporated associa-
tion. Id.
20. The USFL originally filed suit against the NFL on October 17, 1984. On May 30,
1986, the USFL filed its First Amended Complaint. See USFL v. NFL, No. 84 Civ. 7484
(PKL), 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1985-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,547; 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1986-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 67,074, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,075, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
67,076, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,084, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 67,099, 1986-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 67,100, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,101, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,123,
1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,153, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,195, 1986-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,195 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
21. See Janofsky, Final Stages Near in USFL Trial, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1986, at
Dl, col. 5.
22. See USFL v. NFL, supra note 18, at 26.
19871
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monopoly and did violate antitrust law. 3 However, the three con-
tracts between the NFL and the networks were found not to vio-
late the law.2
The USFL case is a good example of the need to clarify the
NFL's power to contract for television coverage. At the very least,
the case has shown that notice must be taken of the NFL's current
state of television coverage and more specifically, its relationship
with the networks. The massive amounts of revenues and the sheer
number of broadcasts preclude rival leagues from any chance of
successfully negotiating lucrative coverage. Even though the NFL
violates the law, the most significant and profitable aspect of its
operation as a league is held to be legal. Clarification is necessary.
This article evaluates the NFL's relationship with the televi-
sion networks as it relates to antitrust law. In order to fully evalu-
ate this relationship, several factors must be examined. First, the
historical development of the NFL's television coverage is ex-
amined. Then, legislative enactments and case law are evaluated.
In this manner, the NFL's use of television to foreclose competi-
tion from rival leagues is analyzed. At some point, Congress will
have to make a determination of just how far a professional sports
league will be permitted to act under the antitrust law.
Congress should consider whether the Sports Broadcasting Act
was intended to limit a league to one network and thereby subject
a league with three network contracts to liability. The courts have
ruled that leagues are not limited in the number of networks they
may contract with. A league can effectively eliminate competition
by contracting with three networks. The time has come to realize
that the NFL is enjoying a full exemption from antitrust laws in
terms of its ability to contract for television coverage. This must be
acknowledged and acted upon.
II. HISTOIcAL BACKGROUND
From the early 1950's through the 1960's, television popularity
grew at an astounding pace. In 1961, for example, approximately
88 percent of the homes in the United States had television sets.
This is contrasted with the approximately 33 percent in 1951.23
23. 634 F. Supp. 155, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 1 67,077.
24. Id. In moving for a new trial, the USFL also asserted that this finding was an
impermissible inconsistency. Judge Leisure ruled, however, that the jury's verdict was not
inconsistent. Id.
25. As of 1961, 47 million of the 53 million U.S. homes had T.V. sets, as contrasted to
the 15 million T.V. homes (out of a potential 45 million) of a decade earlier. See Horowitz,
[Vol. 4:357
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The teams in the NFL wanted to take full advantage of this new
medium of exposure. During the initial development of the NFL,
individual teams contracted with television networks to cover their
games. For example, in 1951, the Chicago Bears contracted with
the DuMont network,2 and then, in 1952, they switched to the
American Broadcasting Company (ABC). 27
The NFL's television contracts have raised the spectre of anti-
trust violations in the past. In 1953, the Justice Department filed
suit against the NFL in United States v. NFL.28 The government
contended that portions of the NFL's constitution and bylaws were
illegal under the Sherman Act.29 Specifically, the Justice Depart-
ment alleged that the NFL's broadcasting policies were unreasona-
ble and illegal restraints of trade.3 0 The NFL argued that inherent
in the maintenance of the league is the ability to protect the
weaker teams, a key to league success.3" The decision ultimately
enjoined the NFL and its member clubs32 from affecting or re-
The Implications of Home Box Office for Sports Broadcasts, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 743, 746
(Winter 1978).
26. The Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. is an Illinois corporation. Antitrust Policy
and Professional Sports, 1981: Hearings on H.R. 523 and 3287 Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly and Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 176,
180 (December 10, 1981) (testimony and statement of George S. Halas).
27. Id. In 1960, Pittsburgh and Baltimore also reached an agreement with NBC for
nationwide telecasts of their regular season games. Id.
28. See United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
29. Id. See also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
30. 116 F. Supp. at 321. Specifically at issue was Article X of the league's bylaws.
Article X, § 10.8 has been amended to include the court's ruling.
The Commissioner will not approve any contracts that do not contain a provi-
sion stating that the contract is subject to Article X as now or hereafter in ef-
fect. . . . Television Income. 10.3 All regular season (and pre-season network)
television income will be divided equally among all member clubs in the League
regardless of the source of such income, except that the member clubs may, by
unanimous agreement, provide otherwise in a specific television contract or con-
tracts. . . . Championship Games. 10.5 The sale of radio and television and film
rights for the World and Conference Championship Games shall be under the
sole jurisdiction of the Commissioner and be subject to the provisions of Article
X. . . . Judgment 10.8 All provisions of Article X are intended to conform to
and be subject to the Final Judgment of the Untied States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania entered December 28, 1953, and as thereafter
modified, against the National Football League and certain of its member clubs;
in the event of any conflict between the Constitution and By-laws and said judg-
ment, the provisions of said Final Judgment, as modified, shall prevail.
NFL CONST. art. X.
31. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 326.
32. In 1953, the NFL consisted of Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington, Pittsburgh,
New York Giants, Chicago Cardinals, Detroit, San Francisco, Los Angeles Rams, Chicago
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stricting the area within which they could telecast games."
The court noted that "[tihe market for the public exhibition
of football no longer is limited to the spectators who attend the
games. Since the advent of television and radio, the visual and au-
ral projections of football games can be marketed anywhere in the
world where there are television or radio facilities. 3 4 The court
stated that "professional football is a unique type of business.""
The court finally found that all professional sports which are or-
ganized on a league basis have "problems which no other business
has."3 6 Fierce intra-league competition off the field could lead to
its downfall. The court recognized this by stating:
It is particularly true in the National Football League that the
teams should not compete too strongly with each other in a bus-
iness way .... Under these circumstances it is both wise and
essential that rules be passed to help the weaker clubs in their
competition with the stronger ones and to keep the league in
fairly even balance.
3 7
Thus, as early as 1953 it was recognized that the NFL is a league
comprised of individual entities" and that special attention was
necessary to establish parity among its teams in order to assure
success.
3 9
The NFL realized that competition for the sale of broadcast
rights reduced its potential revenues and that by having teams
combine their ability to sell the broadcasting rights to games as a
league, it would be able to negotiate for larger contract prices. In
1961, each member team in the NFL pooled its television rights
with those of the other clubs, and the resulting package was sold to
the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS).40 The agreement
33. See United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Sports Broad-
casts-Cable Television Report and Order, F.C.C. 75-819, 54 F.C.C.2d 265 (1975).
34. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). The court also recognized
that football and television shared a unique relationship. "Football provides a magnificent
spectacle for television programs and television provides an excellent outlet and market for
football. They both can use and indeed need each other." Id. at 325.
35. Id. at 325.
36. Id. at 323.
37. Id. at 323.
38. "Individual entities" in this context means business organizations in gen-
eral-corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships. The NFL today consists of 21 corpo-
rations and 7 limited partnerships. Normally, business organizations strive to be better than
all the competition. A league, however, needs cooperation from its members in order to be
successful. Id. at 322.
39. Id. at 323.
40. All the teams would be covered under one agreement and individual teams no
longer had to negotiate for their own coverage. It is important to note that as a package the
(Vol. 4:357
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authorized CBS to televise all league games, not just those negoti-
ated for by the individual teams." This would not only benefit the
league but the networks as well because they could demand higher
rates from the sponsors for advertising that was broadcast during
league games.4
Concerning this new agreement, the Justice Department ad-
vised the NFL that:
[A]rrangements contemplated by the NFL and its member clubs
for the pooling of the television rights of all the clubs and the
sale of the resulting package of pooled television rights to a pur-
chaser raised serious questions under the antitrust law and
would probably be illegal under those laws for reasons including
the elimination of competition among the member clubs in the
sale of television rights, the fixing of prices, tie-ins, and the allo-
cation of telecasting territories.43
In order to ensure that the league package agreement did not vio-
late the 1953 decision, the NFL asked the federal district court
which heard the case whether the terms of its agreement con-
formed to the court's earlier ruling. The court held that its 1953
decision prohibited the execution and performance of the
contract.
46
The court nullified the NFL's agreement on several grounds.
First, the nature of the agreement granted CBS the sole and exclu-
sive right to televise league games for a two-year period." Second,
the court believed that the agreement eliminated competition
among the teams.47
The 1961 ruling in United States v. NFL4 8 imposed a severe
limitation on the NFL. The attempt to pool its rights and negoti-
ate a lucrative contract was stricken down as illegal. In light of this
decision, the NFL concentrated its efforts towards congressional
action. Congress responded by enacting the Sports Broadcasting
NFL could demand a higher price from the networks.
41. See, e.g., United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
42. See Horowitz, supra note 25, at 747.
43. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Op-
position to Defendant's Motion in Limine, at 14, USFL v. NFL (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
44. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
45. United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. at 445. The court also noted that the contract
granted CBS two years of exclusive rights to televise all league games. This agreement was
worth $4,650,000 annually to the NFL. Id. at 446.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 447.
48. 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
19871
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Act.49 The Act granted a limited antitrust exemption to profes-
sional sports leagues.50 Individual teams within a league could now
pool and sell their rights to televise their games 51 and rights to
league games as a whole could now be offered to the networks.
Congress effectively reversed Judge Grim's 1961 judgment.52 The
NFL's reliance on the Sports Broadcasting Act has allowed it to
create and develop its present state of television coverage.5
The legislative history behind the Sports Broadcasting Act has
been a factor in the NFL's ability to contract with the three net-
works. The stated purpose of the Act was to enable individual
teams within professional sports leagues to pool their separate
rights in sponsored telecasting of games and to permit the leagues
to sell the package to a purchaser .5  The Senate Committee felt
that public interest in league sports warranted recognition of anti-
trust principles 55 and allowed individual teams to pool their rights
to sell television coverage. The Commissioner indicated this would
result in the minimal sacrifice of antitrust law. 6
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the antitrust
exemption is not absolute. Members of the various committees
were concerned with the possibility of one league entering into
contracts with all three networks. This would put competitors at a
disadvantage.5 When a subcommittee suggested expressly to
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., re-
printed in U.S. 1961 CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3042.
50. In pertinent part the Act reads:
The antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among per-
sons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of foot-
ball, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs participating
in professional football, baseball, basketball or hockey contests sells or otherwise
transfers all or any part of the rights of such league's member clubs in the spon-
sored telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the
case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.
Sports Broadcasting Act, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1291-95 (1982)).
51. Id.
52. See note 33 and accompanying text.
53. See note 18 and accompanying text. Unchecked by the courts or by Congress, the
NFL has been able to take full advantage of the antitrust exemption provided by the Sports
Broadcasting Act.
54. S. REP. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. 1961 CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3042. See generally USFL v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
55. S. REP. No. 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. 1961 CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 3044.
56. Id.
57. See generally Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearings on H.R. 8757
before the Antitrust Subcomm. (Sub-comm. No. 5) of the House Committee on the Judici-
ary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1961).
[Vol. 4:357
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amend the bill to prohibit a league from entering into a contract
with more than one network, the NFL stated it had no intention of
using more than one network."
While lobbying for the Act, Hamilton Carothers, counsel for
the NFL, stated that "the objective of this legislation is to give us
the right to go on a single network." 59 The Act was' often infor-
mally referred to as the "single network plan.""0
The House Report on the bill states:
Some concern has been expressed that the language of this sec-
tion might be considered to give an absolute exemption for the
antitrust laws for any kind of television arrangements entered
into by a league, and particularly an arrangement which might
involve several networks and might thus exclude a competing
league from all television coverage. This is not the intent of H.R.
9096 which is designed to permit the sale of television rights by
a league and its member clubs to a single network. The Commit-
tee does not intend that an exemption from the antitrust laws
should be made available to a league or its members where the
intent or effect of a joint agreement is to exclude a competing
league or its members from the sale of any of their television
rights."1
This history shows that Congress recognized the possibility of mis-
application of the Act and also that committee members were re-
luctant to allow one league to tie up all three networks.62 It is sig-
nificant that when Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act
it expressly stated that the usual antitrust laws would apply."
The NFL currently enjoys television coverage of its games on
all three major networks.6 4 This development effectively precludes
other professional football leagues from sharing in the benefits of
58. Id. (Statement of Hamilton Carothers).
59. Id. at 302 (Deposition of Alvin R. Rozelle).
60. See supra note 55.
61. See H.R. REP. No. 1178, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
62. See USFL v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1294, in pertinent part, reads:
Nothing contained in this Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 1291 et seq.] shall be deemed to
change, determine or otherwise affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the
antitrust laws to any act, contract, agreement, rule, course of conduct, or other
activity by, between, or among persons engaging in, conducting, or participating
in the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, basketball, or
hockey except the agreements to which section 1 of this Act [15 U.S.C. § 12911
shall apply.
15 U.S.C. § 1294 (1982).
64. See supra notes 18 and 53 and accompanying text.
19871
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major network television coverage. All three networks televise
NFL games. As a practical matter, this leaves no network available
for a new rival league. The development of television coverage of
professional football has far outgrown that which was originally
conceptualized by the courts, Congress, and the NFL.
III. ESTABLISHING TELEVISION COVERAGE
History has made it apparent that the development of a pro-
fessional football league is necessarily linked to television. Individ-
ual teams in the NFL originally contracted for coverage of their
own games.66 After the enactment of the Sports Broadcasting Act
and after the agreement with CBS became exempt from antitrust
liability, however, the teams were able to pool their rights to the
broadcasting of games. 7 The National Broadcasting Company
(NBC) then acquired the rights to televise the NFL Championship
games6" and further extended the relationship between television
and the NFL.
In 1960, the American Football League (AFL)" entered the
picture. The AFL initially reached a pooled rights agreement with
ABC.7 0 The first league-wide television contract for the NFL was
negotiated by Pete Rozelle in 1962.7' In 1964, the AFL switched to
the NBC network and agreed to a five-year pact.7 2 The NFL
merged with the AFL in 1966. 78 With the merger, the NFL ob-
tained the use of a second network through which it could televise
65. Sharing should be mandated for Sundays in the fall, which are the most valuable
time slots.
66. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
68. In 1951 the championship game was televised for the first time on the DuMont
Network. The network paid $75,000 for the rights. In 1955, NBC replaced DuMont as the
network carrying the title game. NBC paid $100,000 for the rights. See B. RIFFENBURGH,
supra note 32, at 41.
69. The AFL was formed in 1959-1960. The league commenced play during the 1960
season.
70. In July 1960, the AFL signed a five-year pooled rights agreement with ABC to
televise its games. See supra note 67.
71. D. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 5. It was worth $326,000 to each franchise. Id.
72. In 1964 the AFL signed a five-year, $36 million television contract with NBC. The
agreement assured each team approximately $900,000 per year. Interestingly, the NFL, in
1964, signed a new contract with CBS television for a total of $14.1 million for the next two
years. Each club received more than $1 million and CBS acquired the rights to the 1964 and
1965 N.F.L. championship games for which it paid $1.8 million each. Riffenburgh, supra
note 31, at 42-43. See also N.Y. Daily News, July 30, 1985, at 5, col. 2.
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its games.74 The NFL also negotiated with ABC to televise Mon-
day night football games.75 By 1970, the NFL was broadcasting its
games on all three major networks.76
The success of the AFL can largely be attributed to its ability
to negotiate a television contract during viable time periods and
with an available major network.77 Commissioner Foss of the AFL
believed that the success of the AFL was tied to its access to net-
work television. 8 In addition, the revenues and the notoriety de-
rived from television exposure helped the AFL to be successful and
enabled the new league to establish itself. These factors led to the
merger with the NFL.79 Television and professional football grew
and expanded together. As television became a powerful medium
to reach the public at large, the NFL took full advantage of its
accessibility.80 The Sports Broadcasting Act was designed to estab-
lish parity between the NFL and other potential leagues."' The
NFL, however, has become the primary beneficiary of the law.2
For example, the Canadian Football League (CFL), the World
Football League (WFL),83 and the USFL84 were not and have not
been able to establish a lucrative major network contract for their
respective seasons and therefore were unsuccessful. 85 The USFL
74. See USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484, at 13.
75. Id. at 15. In 1969 the NFL contracted with ABC for Monday night games.
76. Id. at 25. The television contracts negotiated by the NFL, which terminated after
the 1973 season, were worth $1.7 million a year to each team. See also D. HARRIS, supra
note 1, at 6.
77. See USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484. See also American Football League v. NFL, 204
F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963). See also supra notes 68 and
70.
78. Id. See also Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine, at 12, USFL v. NFL, No. 84-
7484.
79. Id. Marketability of players such as Joe Namath gave the AFL high visibility. See
N.Y. Daily News, July 30, 1986, at C2, col. 2.
80. Originally the member teams of the NFL arranged their own television coverage,
but eventually the league itself negotiated a contract with a network on behalf of all the
member teams. Today, all three major networks have contracts with the N.F.L.
81. Hochberg, Congress Kicks a Field Goal: The Legislative Attack in the 93d Con-
gress on Sports Broadcasting Practices, 27 FED. COMM. B.J. 70 (1974). See also supra notes
51-59.
82. Id. at 70.
83. The World Football League was formed in 1973-1974 and it.started play in 1974. It
is important to note that the WFL contracted with an independent network, T.V.S. Televi-
sion Network, for one WFL game to be broadcast per week. In 1975, however, T.V.S. did not
renew the contract.
84. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
85. The CFL has no network coverage in the United States and only limited access to
cable television. The WFL had only one year of independent network coverage. USFL
games are played in the spring, whereas football is traditionally played in the fall.
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did have limited coverage with ABC and the Entertainment and
Sports Programming Network (ESPN) cable network for its spring
season.80 Howard Cosell, a prominent sports figure, noted that any
football league playing in the spring would be labeled "bush
league" because spring is not the historical time of year when pro-
fessional football is played.8 7
Mere access to television, then, is not enough. Practical and
viable access is required. The exposure television affords to profes-
sional sports leagues and its necessity to continued growth cannot
be overlooked. Any new football league must depend on television
to be an integral part in the advertising and development of that
league's product in order for it to survive. Without effective access
to major television networks and the revenues which such access
can generate, serious competition to the NFL is unlikely.
Making competition difficult does not, in itself, violate anti-
trust law.88 However, the NFL's effective lock on the television
market calls into question the propriety of its contracts.89 Compe-
tition for access to the airwaves was practically eliminated once the
networks were thoroughly committed to the NFL. The networks
are afraid of losing programming or getting stuck with inferior
game schedules, thus endangering their lucrative relationship with
the league.90 Preventing rival leagues' access to television coverage
eliminates competition and may well constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws.
The protection of competition is the essence of the Sherman
Act. 1 This statute was enacted to prevent unreasonable restraint
of trade by way of injury to or elimination of competitors.92 The
86. ABC entered into a two year (1983-1984) contract with the USFL for $18.3 million.
ABC also has two option years worth $15.5 million in 1985 and $19.5 million in 1986. See
Newsday, July 11, 1986 at C2, col. 2; USA Today, Oct. 18, 1984 at C2, col. 2. In addition, the
USFL contracted with the ESPN Cable network for $7 million. Newsday, July 30, 1986, at
3, col. 3.
87. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Op-
position to Defendant's Motion in Limine, USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), at
36. See also Janofsky, Trump Describes Talks with Rozelle, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1986, at
B7, col. 3. Pete Rozelle reportedly stated that the "USFL was 'doomed to failure' as a spring
league and that there was 'no way possible' the league could get a television contract for the
fall, when NFL games are telecast on all three networks." Id.
88. See Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 910 (1957).
89. The market for major television coverage is limited, and too much influence and
dominance are wielded by the NFL.
90. See supra note 85 and Accompanying text.
91. The Sherman Act is intended to protect competition. See supra note 87.
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NFL's use of television has exceeded the limited exemption
granted by the Sports Broadcasting Act, and more importantly, it
has eliminated competition. Preventing rival leagues' access to tel-
evision coverage eliminates competition. An examination of the
three major networks' dealings with the NFL show how and why
rival leagues have been effectively precluded from negotiating for
television rights to their games.
IV. THE TELEVISION CONTRACTS
The NFL's original contracts with the three networks covered
the 1970-1973 seasons93 and brought the league $185 million."
This figure rose to $268 million for the 1974-1977 seasons, 3 and to
$646 million for the 1978-1981 seasons. Under the terms of the
most recent contracts, the NFL was to receive approximately $2.1
billion over the five-year period between 1982-1986.""
A. CBS and NBC
Two essentially identical contracts cover the broadcast rights
of most NFL games. Under one of these contracts, CBS received
the rights to most National Football Conference (NFC) games.
NBC was to carry most American Football Conference (AFC)
games under their contract with the league. The contracts specified
the number and time of the games each network had the rights to
broadcast, the amount of commercial time the networks could sell,
and the league's scheduling obligations.9 The league received $100
93. Joint Pretrial Order, at 11, USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id.
96. Id. Three separate contracts were executed between the NFL and CBS, NBC, and
ABC. On March 16, 1982, ABC and the NFL signed their contract. On March 17, 1982, CBS
signed its contract with the NFL. On March 22, 1982, NBC entered into its contractual
agreement with the NFL. See also N.Y. Times, July 30, 1986, at D20, col. 1.
97. CBS received the telecast rights to two pre-season night games, one pre-season day
game, all regular season intra-conference games, all regular season NFC "away" games
against AFC opponents, all post season NFC games, except the NFC championship, and the
right of first refusal to any games NBC was unable to broadcast. Plaintiff's Exhibit 162,
USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). CBS was limited to 24 minutes of commercials
during any telecast in the 1982, 1983, and 1984 seasons. Id. at 8, 11. The network was al-
lowed to sell an additional minute of ads per game in 1985. Id.
In return, the league was obligated to schedule sixteen weeks of regular season games
on Sunday afternoons; one Thanksgiving Day game, two saturday afternoon games in De-
cember; one divisional playoff qualifying game, and semifinal divisional playoff games. The
NBC contract included similar terms for AFC games. Plaintiff's Exhibit 166, USFL v. NFL,
84-7484 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). NBC and the league entered into a separate contract for the con-
ference championship games. Id.
1987]
13
Garubo: The Last Legal Monopoly: The NFL and its Television Contracts
Published by Institutional Repository, 1987
370 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
million from CBS for the right to carry NFC games in 1982. In
1983, the network paid $120 million; in 1984, $140 million; $145
million in 1985, and $160 million in 1986.'s CBS generated massive
revenues from these contracts." Although the terms of the NFL-
NBC contract were similar, they differed in one significant respect:
NBC paid the league $75 million less than CBS for its contract
rights. 00
B. ABC
The American Broadcasting Company television contract with
the NFL was different from those of the other networks. ABC con-
tracted with the NFL for a "Monday Night Package" and certain
"specials" during the 1982-1986 seasons.' 0 ' Specifically, ABC ob-
tained coverage for sixteen regular-season Monday night prime
time games each year.'0 2 In addition, ABC obtained the broadcast
rights for five regular-season prime time games each season to be
played on a combination of Sunday and Thursday evenings 1 3 and
for two pre-season night games each year.1 4 The quality of the
games to be televised by ABC would be those deemed "important"
ones, presumably to ensure the network high ratings during prime
time.' 05
The regular season payment schedule'" called for a $110 mil-
lion payment in 1982, $120 million in 1983, $130 million in 1984,
$140 million in 1985, and $150 million in 1986.10 In addition, it is
important to note that for the 1986 season the league and the net-
work shared the net revenues from the sale of commercial minutes
during regular-season games. 08 Any revenue from sales above
$340,000 per average minute was divided so as to give the NFL
40% and ABC 60% of that revenue. 9
98. NBC paid $90 million in 1982, $106 million in 1983, $120 million in 1984, $130
million in 1985, and $145 million in 1986. Id.
99. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
100. Plaintiff's Exhibit 166, USFL v. NFL, 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
101. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 161, USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484.
102. Id. at 1.
103. Id.
104. Id. Each pre-season game was worth $500,000 to the NFL. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Id. In addition, ABC paid the NFL $15 million for the rights to Super Bowl XIX
and $14 million for the five AFC-NFC Pro Bowl games covered under the terms of the
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One of the most significant features of all three contracts was
that they had to conform to the Sports Broadcasting Act.110 The
Sports Broadcasting Act today plays a major part in the NFL's
scheme of negotiating for television coverage. The exemption pro-
vided for by the Act was applicable to all three contracts. One rea-
son why the contracts covered different conferences and different
days and times' was to avoid the appearance that the League was
monopolizing the networks. Given the varying terms in each of the
contracts, the appearance was that of a pooled rights agreement
with a network which is legal under the Act."
The network contracts were non-exclusive and did not pre-
clude the networks from broadcasting other professional football
leagues.118 This does not justify, however, the NFL's effective lock
over each network. The networks televise many games and invest
large amounts of money into those telecasts. Neal Pilson, President
of CBS Sports, stated that the NFL was the biggest supplier CBS
deals with." 4 The networks obviously have a huge interest in keep-
ing their contracts with the NFL. In addition, there is substantial
exposure generated from the coverage by the three networks. Sun-
day games, Saturday games, Thursday night games, and Monday
night games all afford the NFL phenomenal exposure to the pub-
lic. Rival professional football leagues should have access to this
exposure and publicity. More notably, rival professional football
leagues should be afforded the opportunity to reap some of the
monetary benefits that the networks confer on the NFL.
In March 1987, the NFL negotiated new deals worth $1.438
billion dollars for the television coverage of its games." 5 Under the
terms of the new contracts, the NFL will receive $479 million dol-
lars a year for the next three years." 6 Not only will NBC, CBS and
ABC continue their broadcast of NFL games, but additional games
110. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
111. The distinct features include: (1) CBS televises the NFC; (2) NBC televises the
AFC; and (3) ABC televises prime time games. If each network carried games from both
conferences, and both day and night games, then the monopolizing of the networks would be
more apparent.
112. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
113. USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484, opinion 2, at 3.
114. Janofsky, CBS Feared Loss of NFL, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986 at A32, col. 5.
115. Heisler, 3-Year, $1.4 Billion TV Deal Is Approved, L.A. Times, March 16, 1987,
3, at 2, col. 1.
116. Goodwin, Networks Save Cash, Gain a Competitor, N.Y. Times, March 17, 1987,
4, at 30, col. 3. These agreements call for a fixed payment schedule as opposed to the esca-
lating agreements under the 1982 contracts. See also note 105 and accompanying text.
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will now be televised on ESPN." 7 Under the new contract, ESPN
will televise eight Sunday night games as well as five prime time
specials.118 Facing the possibility of a drastic reduction in in-
come,119 the NFL accepted a 3.3 percent cut in revenues. Each
team will still earn approximately $17 million per year for the term
of the contracts.
The most significant recent development, however, is a Fed-
eral Trade Commission inquiry into the NFL's television con-
tracts. 2 ' The FTC examined the television contracts in an effort to
determine whether the three major networks and the league ille-
gally conspired to keep "Monday Night Football" off of the new
Fox Broadcasting Network or any other networks that had not
previously broadcast NFL games.' During the preliminary inves-
tigation, the FTC contacted Fox, ESPN and Home Box Office.' 22
The FTC probe demonstrates an effort on the part of the govern-
ment to evaluate the lock that has been placed on professional
football broadcasting by the major networks and the league. If its
investigation determines that the league and networks have acted
improperly and are violating the antitrust laws, the government
has the power to nullify the new contracts.2 3 Such a consequence
will force the league and the networks to rethink their relationship,
and indicates that Congress might want to do the same.
V. ANTITRUST CASE LAW
In order to fully appreciate the significance of the television
contracts, antitrust law and how it is typically applied must be ex-
amined. This Comment attempts to evaluate some of the antitrust
cases concerning the NFL in order to determine where the courts
stand and how competitors of the NFL may be able to effectuate
competition through the use of television. Courts have held that
the NFL has violated the law. Logic and consistency demand that
the television contracts enjoyed by the NFL also be held to violate
117. Heisler, supra note 115. See also Ross, Sports Broadcasting, Antitrust, and Pub-
lic Policy, 7 SPORTS LAW. 2 (Spring 1988) (discussion of the applicabilty of the Sports
Broadcasting Act and antitrust law to the NFL-ESPN contract).
118. Goodwin, supra note 214.
119. The networks argued that the NFL's lower ratings after the 1982 strike and the
softer market for advertising reduced the value of the contracts. Heisler, supra note 115.
120. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1987, 1, p. 53, col. 5.
121. Id.
122. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1987, 1, p. 53, col. 5.
123. Goodwin, FTC Probes NFL's Network Television Contracts, Miami News, July 7,
1987, § 5, at 1, col. 2.
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Antitrust law is generally understood to encompass the laws
relating to monopoly and to restraints or trade limitations on com-
mercial competition, as well as unfair competitive practices." 4 Sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act generally requires some combination
or common action by two or more actors or legal entities. 12 5 Section
two of the Sherman Act is violated by the unilateral action of a
single entity. 26 Overall, the Sherman Act attempts to preserve the
free action of competition.1 27
Generally, two evaluative standards of liability exist under the
Sherman Act. One standard is a per se violation. Certain conduct
may be found unreasonable per se and thus illegal. 28 The second is
a rule of reason test which looks to the legality or illegality of the
conduct in relation to the economic circumstances in which it takes
place. 29 The rule of reason, a more liberal standard, permits justi-
fication of the challenged action, whereas the per se doctrine per-
mits no inquiry into the considerations or reasons behind the al-
leged restraints.3 0
Antitrust cases involving the NFL have repeatedly rejected
the per se doctrine and have applied the rule of reason test."' The
goal of sports teams is to compete on the field and cooperate off
the field. 3 2 The National Football League structure requires coop-
eration between its teams. Thus, "a certain deviation from the
ideal of free competition . . . is justified because it makes possible
a product which unlimited competition could not produce. 3
124. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
125. Id. See also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
126. See generally American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
127. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc., v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 443 F. Supp. 639, 642-
43 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
128. Id. at 640. See also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Trials Defending Antitrust Lawsuits § 4
(1977). Per se violations include price-fixing, commercial boycotts, and division of market
territories among competitors.
129. See Redwing, 443 F. Supp. at 641, 642. See also 24 AM. JuR. 2D Trials Defending
Antitrust Lawsuits § 4 (1977).
130. See Redwing, 443 F. Supp. at 641, 642-43. See also 24 Am. Juf. 2D Trials Defend-
ing Antitrust Lawsuits § 4 (1977).
131. See supra notes 3-6 (cases cited therein all apply the rule of reason test).
132. See United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). See also Comment,
Antitrust and Professional Sports: Does Anyone Play by the Rules of the Game? 22 CATH.
U.L. REv. 403 (1977).
133. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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A. The Sherman Act and Professional Football
In United States v. NFL,3 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania looked at intra-league ac-
tivity and held that the antitrust laws apply to professional foot-
ball. The court further held that Article X of the NFL's constitu-
tion and bylaws violated the Sherman Act as an unreasonable
restraint of trade.' " To avoid application of the Sherman Act, the
NFL initially argued that professional football is not commerce or
interstate commerce.' 3 6 This proposition was soundly rejected by
the court. 8 7 The court stated that "[r]adio and television clearly
are in interstate commerce,. . . [t]he restrictions by professional
football on the sale of radio and television rights impose substan-
tial restraints on the television and radio industry.'1
3 8
In Radovich v. NFL," 9 the Supreme Court of the United
States expressly held that professional football is subject to the
Sherman Act." The Court noted that the volume of interstate
business involved in professional football places it within the pro-
visions of the Sherman Act.' 4 ' The Court further held that "black-
listing" of players by the NFL was the result of a conspiracy."2
The purpose of this conspiracy was to regulate the terms upon
which professional football would be played. "'
The NFL's player draft was held to be an unreasonable re-
straint on trade in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc."4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia analyzed the
NFL clubs' participation in the draft and noted that it eliminated
competition among the clubs for players' services." 5 In Mackey v.
NFL," the issue was the "Rozelle Rule.' ' 7 This rule restricted
134. 116 F. Supp 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
135. Id. at 327. This specifically suggests intra-league competition between teams con-
spiring among themselves as opposed to interleague competition.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) and Allen B.
Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950)).
138. Id.
139. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
140. Id. at 452. The United States Supreme Court further held that professional base-
ball is not subject to federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
141. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452.
142. Id. at 448.
143. Id.
144. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
145. Id. at 1185.
146. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 430 U.S. 801 (1977).
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the movement of free agents between the teams. This restriction
was held to be unreasonable. 8 In Kapp v. NFL,"' the "no tam-
pering rule" and the player draft were also held to unreasonably
restrain trade.'50 The Kapp plaintiffs argued that the NFL's ac-
tions, in relation to their alleged boycott of NFL players, consti-
tuted an illegal boycott and an unjustified exercise of monopoly
power.
15'
• These cases illustrate that the NFL is not only subject to the
antitrust laws but that some of its past business activities have vio-
lated antitrust laws. The NFL has been repeatedly confronted with
different antitrust law theories. Analysis of these cases indicates
their relevancy to the NFL's position concerning its television con-
tracts. Based on the various theories and existing case law, it is
evident that the NFL is violating the present antitrust laws with
its present three network contracts.
B. Essential Facilities
Of all the theories regarding the NFL and antitrust law, the
most relevant and helpful to the analysis of the validity of the net-
work contracts is the doctrine of "essential facilities." One defini-
tion of this doctrine states:
If a group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a common
facility and if due to natural advantage, custom or restrictions of
scale, it is not feasible for excluded competitors to duplicate the
facility, the competitors who operate the facility must give ac-
cess to the excluded competitors on reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory terms.'5'
In Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc.,' 3 the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia stated that "to be essential a facility
147. The "Rozelle Rule" allowed the Commissioner to be the final arbitrator in all
trades. The Commissioner exercised his power by granting monetary reimbursement to
teams losing a player who did not play out the option year on his contract. Id. at 620-21.
148. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622.
149. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in part as
moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978).
150. Id. Similar restraints have been held to violate antitrust law in other sports. See
Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (suggesting in dictum that NBA player
draft and reserve clause may violate antitrust law); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (denying preliminary injunc-
tion on per se theory but suggesting that the NHL reserve clause may violate the Rule of
Reason).
151. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 81-82.
152. L. SULLIVAN, ANTUST 131 (1977).
153. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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need not be indispensible."'1 "If duplication of a facility is eco-
nomically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handi-
cap on potential market entrants," 55 then it is an illegal restraint
of trade to foreclose the facility from competitors. Network televi-
sion coverage is an essential facility to potential leagues seeking to
enter the professional football market. Duplication of network cov-
erage and the substantial monetary value afforded the NFL is eco-
nomically infeasible for a rival league.
In Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL" it was held that the doctrine
is applicable only where a party is being denied access to the
means necessary to engage in a business which is controlled by his
competitors. 57 Major network coverage cannot be duplicated else-
where. The coverage which the NFL enjoys exceeds its needs and
sharing of this "essential ingredient" is necessary to establish a vi-
able league. Without the essential facility of television coverage, a
league is doomed to failure.
In American Football League v. NFL 58 the AFL alleged,
among other things, that successful operation of a major profes-
sional football league requires the sale of television rights.159 The
Sherman Act allegations failed because the AFL had secured tele-
vision coverage of its games. 6 ' The rival league had entered into a
contract similar to the one negotiated by the NFL. The United
States District Court in Maryland did, however, agree that access
to television coverage was necessary to the viability of a sports
league. 6'
As exemplified by the holding in American Football League,
television coverage is essential to the establishment of a new
league. Duplication of major network broadcasting is economically
and physically unfeasible. 62 The resources and experience of any
one of the major networks make them essential. At the very least,
154. Id. at 985.
155. Id. at 992.
156. 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1982).
157. Id. at 569. The court also noted that under the authority of Fleer Corp. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 611 (1982), a licens-
ing contract could be subject to this doctrine.
158. 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
159. Id. at 62.
160. Id. at 65. See also supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
161. American Football League v. NFL, 204 F. Supp. at 62.
162. See Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1969). The new Fox
Broadcasting Network and Turner Broadcasting should be considered. A professional foot-
ball league needs the massive exposure that these two "stations" currently are unable to
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one network should be available to other leagues. In sum,
mandatory access is necessary iand other professional football
leagues should be free in practice as well as theory to contract with
at least one network.
C. Group Boycott
Another theory of antitrust law that brings the NFL's network
contracts into question is group boycott. A group boycott was de-
fined in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.6 ' as a "concerted attempt by a
group of competitors at one level to protect themselves from com-
petition from nongroup members who seek to compete at that
level."'" The boycotting group typically deprives the competition
from gaining access to the trade relationship which is needed to
enter and survive in the same group or business.'65 The Smith
court stated that the NFL draft constituted an unreasonable re-
straint of trade under the rule of reason because it virtually elimi-
nated economic competition among the buyers for services of the
sellers. e66
The NFL's three major network television contracts should be
viewed as a group boycott. 6 ' There is a concerted attempt (all the
teams pool their contract rights and sell them to the networks) to
insulate themselves (the league members) from competition. From
an economic standpoint, the teams conspire in order to increase
their benefits which, in effect, creates a group boycott.' 6 The
twenty-eight NFL teams, by employing a pooled-rights agreement,
are able to derive great economic benefits from the sale of the con-
tracts. 1 Overall, by contracting with the three networks, the NFL
163. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979). It is interesting to note that if there are allega-
tions of an antitrust violation, courts are bound to apply either the per se test or the rule of
reason test. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In this case
the court stated that "[blecause of the unique character of professional sports, then, courts
have rejected the per se test and have routinely applied the Rule of Reason in deciding
antitrust suits concerning league practices." Id. at 566.
164. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1186. The buyers were the teams and the sellers were the players. In order
to justify the NFL draft, however, the court looked at factors such as higher salaries for the
players and increased financial security for the clubs. Id.
167. Whether or not the allegation is to withstand the scrutiny of the rule of reason
test will be decided by the courts.
168. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Pooled rights contracts are more valu-
able to the NFL because it can demand a higher price for the product. The NFL can sell
more games than individual teams and it has the ability to monitor scheduling conflicts and
structure the seasons.
169. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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is provided with extensive revenue and publicity while depriving
rival leagues access to television coverage on a major network. It is
a small consolation that new and smaller networks are interested
in televising professional football games. 170 If the NFL limited it-
self to a single network, as was originally contemplated by the
Sports Broadcasting Act,17 1 the other networks would be free to
contract with other leagues.1
72
D. The Single Entity Defense
Application of section one of the Sherman Act is usually lim-
ited to a plurality of actors.17 The single entity defense, often as-
serted by the NFL, entails conduct which neither implicates nor
impinges upon competition between member clubs.11 4 The teams,
as individual business organizations, group together and pool their
rights to the television broadcasts of their games. 75 Under this sce-
nario, the league is regarded as a single economic entity and the
Sherman Act does not apply.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
170. Recently, Fox Broadcasting Company announced that it wants to televise NFL
games on its network. The significant disadvantage of Fox is its relative youth and unfamili-
arity with the business. Although Fox has approximately 100 affiliates, the exposure it could
grant to a new league would be limited. Presently, no comparison can be made between
what Fox can offer a professional football league and what one of the major networks can
offer. See L.A. Times, Jan. 12, 1987, at § 3, p.5, col. 1. The same can be said of cable net-
works and superstations. The publicity and notoriety obtainable with these television agents
is limited due to limited cable access. Nearly 87 million American households have televi-
sion sets, but only 41 million (47%) of these homes subscribe to cable television. See Video
Week, Sept. 15, 1986 at 5; Video Week, May 5, 1986 at 3. See also Affidavit of Edward
Einhorn at 5, USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
171. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
172. With the development of the NFL and its merger with the AFL, this is practi-
cally impossible. But see Moore, It's 4th & 10-The NFL Needs The Long Bomb, FORTUNE,
Aug. 4, 1986, at 160, 166: "The N.F.L. could also have sold its games to only 2 networks and
sold a third package to pay T.V., syndication, or one of the budding 'fourth networks'-a
move it is considering if one of the networks doesn't cough up enough money next year. So
long as one network remains open, a would-be competitor cannot blame its problems on an
N.F.L. television monopoly." Id.
173. North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d at 1256 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459
U.S. 1074 (1982).
174. Id.
175. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The NFL is comprised of 21 corpora-
tions and 7 limited partnerships.
176. However, in some circumstances courts will find a combination sufficient to sat-
isfy the statutory requirement by looking at action of corporate affiliates, or even at an
agreement among corporate officers. North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 505 F. Supp. 659,
677 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 670 F.2d 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). If
this is so, then surely agreements among the 28 NFL teams may be considered a combina-
tion and could not be covered by the single entity defense.
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held in North American Soccer League v. National Football
League1" that:
The characterization of the NFL as a single economic entity
does not exempt from the Sherman Act an agreement between
its members to restrain competition. To tolerate such a loophole
would permit league members to escape antitrust responsibility
for any restraint entered into by them that could benefit their
league or enhance their ability to compete even though the ben-
efit would be outweighed by its anti-competitive effects.178
This case eliminated the NFL's single entity claim. 179 The court
looked to the teams themselves to make its ruling.180 It is probable
that the court reasoned that the league is comprised of various
business organizations in the form of teams and because the teams
conspire amongst themselves, the antitrust laws should be
applied.' 8'
The NFL's television contracts violate the spirit of the law, if
not its letter. Congress must realize that the NFL has effectively
eliminated competition from rival professional football leagues
through the use of its three television contracts. The Sports Broad-
casting Act contemplated the sale of contract rights to one net-
work. 18 2 However, the NFL-AFL merger approved by Congress en-
abled one league to control television access. 83 It seems that the
courts are now reluctant to limit the NFL's powers. It is up to
Congress to correct the situation and undo what it started in 1961.
VI. UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL
LEAGUE
The most recent antitrust suit brought against the NFL is
USFL v. NFL."s4 Attention focused on this case because, in large
part, the USFL alleged that the NFL's network television con-
tracts violated antitrust law. The USFL argued that the network
contracts effectively precluded the USFL from having its games
televised and denied the USFL the exposure necessary to compete
177. 670 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1982).




182. See supra notes 11 and 51-60 and accompanying text.
183. Congressional approval for the merger was reflected by the enactment of the
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1982).
184. 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
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with the NFL.15 Harry Usher, the Commissioner of the USFL, felt
that a league needs star players to compete with the NFL, and
only revenues from a lucrative television contract could provide
the necessary funds to pay these players." 6 Counsel for the USFL
asserted that "television is at the heart of this case." A competitor
with a network contract (like the AFL prior to its merger with the
NFL) is a threat to the NFL. A competitor denied a network con-
tract (like the WFL and the USFL) cannot survive or prosper.87
The USFL sought injunctive relief as well as damages for the
alleged violations of Sections one and two of the Sherman Act.' 8
Specifically, injunctive relief was sought to enjoin the further per-
formance of the contracts."8 9 The USFL asked that the NFL be
directed to maintain a contract with no more than one television
network. 90 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied the USFL's preliminary motion for summary judg-
ment, explaining that the three NFL network contracts did not by
themselves constitute a per se violation.""
The USFL alleged that the NFL network television contracts
exceeded the scope of the antitrust exemption."" The USFL also
claimed that it decided to play football in the spring because the
NFL's three contracts had enabled it to monopolize the network
television coverage of professional football played in the fall. "3
185. USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,075
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (opinion 3).
186. Janofsky, Usher Places Blame on NFL, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1986, at B8, col. 1.
187. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine, USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), at 10.
188. First Amended Complaint, at 1 14-75 and 76-86 of Counts I and II, USFL v.
NFL, No. 84-7484.
189. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine, USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), at 66.
190. Id.
191. USFL v. NFL 634 F. Supp. 1155 (1986). The USFL contended that the NFL's
three television network contracts should be deemed a per se antitrust violation. The trial
court issued a pre-trial order rejecting the USFL's contention that the three NFL network
contracts did not per se violate the antitrust laws. The court also stated, "Whether the
intent or effect of such arrangements are to exclude a competing league, such as the USFL,
from selling any of its television rights presents material questions of fact that cannot be
decided on a summary judgment motion." USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484, 634 F. Supp. 1155,
1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 67,076. See also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. It is "monopolization" in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act for persons to
combine or conspire to acquire or maintain power to exclude competitors from any part of
trade or commerce. They must also have such power that they are able as a group to exclude
actual or potential competition. They must intend to exercise that power. USFL v. NFL,
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The NFL contended that the USFL product was not good enough
for major network broadcasting.""4 The NFL further asserted that
the networks would be willing to negotiate with the USFL for a fall
1987 contract because the NFL's current contracts would expire by
then.
195
The jury in the case reached a verdict after being given in-
structions on monopolization, restraint of trade, essential facilities,
and antitrust damages. 196 Among its findings, the jury concluded
that: (1) the NFL had monopoly power, (2) the monopoly caused
injury to the USFL, (3) there was a contract to exclude competi-
tion; (4) the NFL's 1982-1986 television contracts did not consti-
tute an unreasonable restraint of trade; (5) a national broadcast
contract with at least one of the three major networks was essen-
tial to the ability of a major professional football league to compete
successfully, and (6) potential competitors could not duplicate the
benefits of a network contract. 197 Notwithstanding these findings,
the jury awarded the USFL $1.'a8
The USFL filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that
the jury's determination of liability was inconsistent with itself and
inconsistent with the damage award. 199 The District Court denied
the motion 20 and explained that while the defendant's actions in
their entirety constituted a violation of the Sherman Act, 0 1 the
No. 84-7484, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1986-1 Trade Civ. Cas. (CCH) 67,084 (order #7).
194. Id. at 67,124 (opinion #12).
195. Janofsky, Final Stages Near in U.S.F.L. Trial, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1986, at Cl,
col. 1.
196. USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,218.
197. After the trial, the jury found in total that: (1) there was a relevant market con-
sisting of major league professional football; (2) the NFL had monopoly power; (3) such
monopoly power was willfully acquired or maintained; (4) the monopoly caused injury to the
USFL; (5) the NFL and its member teams conspired to monopolize professional football; (6)
no overt action was taken by any member of the conspiracy to try to acquire or maintain the
monopoly; (7) there was a contract to exclude competition; (9) the restraint was not unrea-
sonable; (10) the NFL's 1982-1986 television contracts did not constitute an unreasonable
restraint of trade; (11) a national broadcast contract with at least one of the three major
networks was essential to the ability of a major professional football league to compete suc-
cessfully; (12) potential competitors could not duplicate the benefits of a network contract;
and (13) the NFL and its members lacked the ability to deny actual or potential competitor
access to a national broadcast television contract. USFL v. NFL, No. 84-7484, 634 F. Supp.
1155, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,218.
198. Id. A Sherman Act violation results in an award of treble damages. The USFL
therefore was awarded $3.
199. Id. at 67,075.
200. Id.
201. Jury findings (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) were specifically indicate that the NFL
violated the Sherman Act. Id.
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specific network contracts claim may be found lawful without cre-
ating an inconsistency.20 2 The finding that the three network con-
tracts were not unreasonable restraints on trade was deemed con-
sistent with the overall verdict rendered by the jury.0 s
Inherent in the jury's determination is a great paradox. The
NFL was a monopoly2 04 and the teams in the league conspired to
exclude competition, 05 yet the objects of the conspiracy, the televi-
sion contracts, were found not to be unreasonable restraints on
trade. While this decision seems reasonable on the surface, in real-
ity, it should not be permitted to stand. Congress must act to clar-
ify the law so that any inconsistencies will be eliminated.
One attempt to change the existing structure of the NFL was
recently thwarted. Based on the jury's finding that the NFL was a
monopoly, the USFL moved to have the league's two conferences
20 6
split into separate entities, each to run itself and negotiate its own
contracts.0 7 The District Court denied the USFL's motion because
the jury found the NFL had not monopolized the television
market.208
The Second Circuit was unsympathetic to the USFL's claim
that the jury findings and verdict were inconsistent 0 9 in affirming
the trial court.210 The court declined to give the USFL "the success
it failed to gain among football fans."'21' Upon hearing the appel-
late outcome, USFL Commissioner Harry Usher remarked "I guess
we died today.
'21 2
In looking to the future, one cannot help but notice Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent from the denial of certiorari in National
202. Id. at 67,074.
203. Id.
204. Id. at jury finding (2).
205. Id. at jury finding (8).
206. The NFL is composed of two conferences: the National Football Conference and
the American Football Conference. Each conference consists of 14 teams the with each con-
ference further broken down into three divisions. See NFL Const. art. IV, § 4.4. See also
L.A. Times, Oct. 17, 1986, at C2, col. 1.
207. L.A. Times, Oct. 17, 1986, at C2, col. 1.
208. Ruling on the USFL's motion to divide the NFL, the court stated: "When a firm
which has committed myriad blunders in the marketplace seeks to gain benefits through
injunctive relief that it could not acquire through fair competition, courts should not be
condemned for obstructing such an effort." L.A. Times, Dec. 18, 1986, at III 8, col. 1.
209. The USFL fared similarly in the trial court: in denying the USFL's motion for a
new trial, Judge Leisure suggested that there was no evident inconsistency in the findings
and verdict. See L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1987, at C3, col. 1.
210. 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Football League v. North American Soccer League.21
The antitrust laws do not require the NFL to operate so as to
make it easier for another league to compete against it. I fear
that, under the decisions below, the maxim that the antitrust
laws exist to protect competition, not competitors, may be re-
duced to a dead letter.
2 1 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist seems anxious to voice his opinion on
the NFL antitrust issue. In addition, Justice Scalia has written ex-
tensively on antitrust law.2 5 Eventually, the Supreme Court may
have an opportunity to decide an antitrust case in the professional
sports league setting.
When the doctrines of essential facilities and group boycott
theories are applied to sports league cases, it is evident that anti-
trust law is being contravened. Violation of these theories without
attaching liability is erroneous. The ball has been handed off;
hopefully, Congress can take it in for the score.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even if the Supreme Court does not review this case, Congress
must act. The NFL has violated the antitrust laws, yet the courts
to date have ignored its actions. Professional sports leagues occupy
a special niche in one interpretation of competition as well as in
our society in general.21 Blatant violations are ignored because of
our affinity for professional sports.
In USFL v. NFL, the USFL's attorney, in closing argument,
stated, "Without minimum damages, the league is dead and it's a
signal to every other sports league that wants to compete that they
are dead, too.
' 17
Congress could expressly amend the Sports Broadcasting Act
to limit NFL broadcasts to one or two networks.18 In this manner,
a new professional football league could negotiate a contract with
networks not televising the NFL. Action along these lines would
promote competition consistent with the Sherman Act because the
213. 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
214. Id. at 1080.
215. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, 55 ANTrrRusT L.J. 205-212 (1986).
216. The league has By-Laws that establish the rules of play on the field and off the
field among the owners. By definition, such an association constitutes a cartel among com-
petitors that in the business world would generally be regarded as illegal under antitrust
law. Moore, supra note 172, at 166.
217. See Pomerantz, Final Points made in USFL Suit, Wash. Post, July 24, 1986, at
D4 col. 5.
218. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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networks would compete with each other to provide the best cover-
age for NFL games. This system would also allow new leagues to
compete with the NFL by giving them the national exposure and
major network revenues that are essential to their success. If Con-
gress does not act to encourage competition, the NFL will forever
be everyone's favorite football league because there will be no
other league which will be able to compete. The existence of a
three network contract alone does not appear to, and has in fact
been held not to, violate the law.219 However, because of the
amounts of money committed to the broadcasting of NFL games,
the networks will not consider major broadcasting packages for
other leagues. It is in this respect that Congress must act, even
though the FTC inquiry may change the way the league and the
networks conduct their dealings. The limited exemption from anti-
trust law granted to professional sports leagues has been applied in
a manner not originally contemplated. It has allowed the NFL to
corner the entire network broadcasting market. It appears that the
courts cannot take action, therefore, Congress must act so that
competition may occur.
Whatever course Congress should choose to take, a reevalua-
tion of the NFL's antitrust position is necessary. Whether limiting
network availability is a viable alternative is a significant question.
It is clear, however, that in progressing from a limited exemption
from the antitrust law in 196122° to the multibillion dollar agree-
ments of today, changes have occurred which must be addressed.
The purpose and ideology of the antitrust laws are being laid to
waste.
Philip A. Garubo, Jr.*
219. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. Throughout the hearings on the
NFL-AFL merger, (15 U.S.C. § 1291 as amended Pub. L. no. 89-800, 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1515),
the NFL requested that they be allowed to broadcast over two networks due to the size of
the merged league and the insufficient broadcast capabilities of a single network.
* This article is dedicated to Philip and Johanna Garubo, who have shown me that all
things are possible, too.
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